rebase-and-code-cleanup #19

links234 · 2015-09-01T14:47:33Z

No description provided.

levex · 2015-09-01T15:02:02Z

Hi,

Pretty sure this isn't how the rebase should be done...

The cleanup commit (d14ee15) looks good from a quick glimpse though.

~L

teobaluta · 2015-09-01T18:26:57Z

Hi,

Thanks for taking this up! Please make two separate pull requests - one for the rebase against latest and another for the cleanup code.

Move the fence related stuff into amdgpu_fence.c v2: rework commit message, cause this is actually not a bug Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Chunming Zhou<david1.zhou@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Junwei Zhang <Jerry.Zhang@amd.com>

Embed the scheduler into the ring structure instead of allocating it. Use the ring name directly instead of the id. v2: rebased, whitespace cleanup Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Junwei Zhang <Jerry.Zhang@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Chunming Zhou<david1.zhou@amd.com>

This causes problems with multiple suspend/resume cycles. Signed-off-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Invalid messages can crash the hw otherwise Ported from radeon commit a1b403d Signed-off-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Fixes suspend issues with UVD. Signed-off-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

User space passed the same handle before suspend and after resume, so we have remove the session and handle destroy, and keep the firmware untouched. Signed-off-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

The patch was generated using fixed coccinelle semantic patch scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci [1]. [1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2014320 Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

The value was much too low, which could cause the userspace visible vblank counter to move backwards when the hardware counter wrapped around. Ported from radeon commit: b0b9bb4 Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jammy Zhou <Jammy.Zhou@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

The amdgpu_cs_parser_init() function doesn't clean up after itself but instead the caller uses a free everything function amdgpu_cs_parser_fini() on failure. This style of error handling is often buggy. In this example, we call "drm_free_large(parser->chunks[i].kdata);" when it is an unintialized pointer or when "parser->chunks" is NULL. I fixed this bug by adding unwind code so that it frees everything that it allocates. I also mode some other very minor changes: 1) Renamed "r" to "ret". 2) Moved the chunk_array allocation to the start of the function. 3) Removed some initializers which are no longer needed. Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

The "alloc_size" calculation can overflow leading to memory corruption. Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

There is no limit on args->data.data_size_bytes so we could read beyond the end of the args->data.data[] array. Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

args->size is a u64. arg->pitch and args->height are u32. The multiplication will overflow instead of using the high 32 bits as intended. Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

we used to adopt wait_reg_mem to let CE wait before DE finish page updating, but from Tonga+, CE doesn't support wait_reg_mem package so this logic no longer works. so here is another approach to do same thing: Insert two of SWITCH_BUFFER at both front and end of vm_flush can guarantee that CE not go further to process IB_const before vm_flush done. Insert two of SWITCH_BUFFER also works on CI, so remove legency method to sync CE and ME v2: Insert double SWITCH_BUFFER at front of vm flush as well. Signed-off-by: monk.liu <monk.liu@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>

In commit 7a3f3d6 Author: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Date: Thu Jul 9 23:44:28 2015 +0200 drm: Check locking in drm_for_each_connector I added locking checks to drm_for_each_connector but failed that through drm_helper_connector_dpms -> drm_helper_choose_encoder_dpms it's used in a few more places in the radeon resume/suspend code. Fix them up. Note that we could use the connector iterator macros in there too, but that's for the future. Reported-and-tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

In commit 7a3f3d6 Author: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Date: Thu Jul 9 23:44:28 2015 +0200 drm: Check locking in drm_for_each_connector I added locking checks to drm_for_each_connector but failed that through drm_helper_connector_dpms -> drm_helper_choose_encoder_dpms it's used in a few more places in the amdgpu resume/suspend code. Fix them up. Note that we could use the connector iterator macros in there too, but that's for the future. Port of radeon commit: drm/radeon: Sprinkle drm_modeset_lock_all to appease locking checks Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

Just adds the quirk for MSI R7 370 Armor 2X Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91294 Signed-off-by: Maxim Sheviakov <mrader3940@yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

RST packets sent on behalf of TCP connections with TS option (RFC 7323 TCP timestamps) have incorrect TS val (set to 0), but correct TS ecr. A > B: Flags [S], seq 0, win 65535, options [mss 1000,nop,nop,TS val 100 ecr 0], length 0 B > A: Flags [S.], seq 2444755794, ack 1, win 28960, options [mss 1460,nop,nop,TS val 7264344 ecr 100], length 0 A > B: Flags [.], ack 1, win 65535, options [nop,nop,TS val 110 ecr 7264344], length 0 B > A: Flags [R.], seq 1, ack 1, win 28960, options [nop,nop,TS val 0 ecr 110], length 0 We need to call skb_mstamp_get() to get proper TS val, derived from skb->skb_mstamp Note that RFC 1323 was advocating to not send TS option in RST segment, but RFC 7323 recommends the opposite : Once TSopt has been successfully negotiated, that is both <SYN> and <SYN,ACK> contain TSopt, the TSopt MUST be sent in every non-<RST> segment for the duration of the connection, and SHOULD be sent in an <RST> segment (see Section 5.2 for details) Note this RFC recommends to send TS val = 0, but we believe it is premature : We do not know if all TCP stacks are properly handling the receive side : When an <RST> segment is received, it MUST NOT be subjected to the PAWS check by verifying an acceptable value in SEG.TSval, and information from the Timestamps option MUST NOT be used to update connection state information. SEG.TSecr MAY be used to provide stricter <RST> acceptance checks. In 5 years, if/when all TCP stack are RFC 7323 ready, we might consider to decide to send TS val = 0, if it buys something. Fixes: 7faee5c ("tcp: remove TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Drivers might call napi_disable while not holding the napi instance poll_lock. In those instances, its possible for a race condition to exist between poll_one_napi and napi_disable. That is to say, poll_one_napi only tests the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit to see if there is work to do during a poll, and as such the following may happen: CPU0 CPU1 ndo_tx_timeout napi_poll_dev napi_disable poll_one_napi test_and_set_bit (ret 0) test_bit (ret 1) reset adapter napi_poll_routine If the adapter gets a tx timeout without a napi instance scheduled, its possible for the adapter to think it has exclusive access to the hardware (as the napi instance is now scheduled via the napi_disable call), while the netpoll code thinks there is simply work to do. The result is parallel hardware access leading to corrupt data structures in the driver, and a crash. Additionaly, there is another, more critical race between netpoll and napi_disable. The disabled napi state is actually identical to the scheduled state for a given napi instance. The implication being that, if a napi instance is disabled, a netconsole instance would see the napi state of the device as having been scheduled, and poll it, likely while the driver was dong something requiring exclusive access. In the case above, its fairly clear that not having the rings in a state ready to be polled will cause any number of crashes. The fix should be pretty easy. netpoll uses its own bit to indicate that that the napi instance is in a state of being serviced by netpoll (NAPI_STATE_NPSVC). We can just gate disabling on that bit as well as the sched bit. That should prevent netpoll from conducting a napi poll if we convert its set bit to a test_and_set_bit operation to provide mutual exclusion Change notes: V2) Remove a trailing whtiespace Resubmit with proper subject prefix V3) Clean up spacing nits Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: jmaxwell@redhat.com Tested-by: jmaxwell@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 7d82410 ("virtio: add explicit big-endian support to memory accessors") accidentally changed the virtio_net header used by AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR from host-endian to big-endian. Since virtio_legacy_is_little_endian() is a very long identifier, define a vio_le macro and use that throughout the code instead of the hard-coded 'false' for little-endian. This restores the ABI to match 4.1 and earlier kernels, and makes my test program work again. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

On K2HK, sgmii module registers of slave 0 and 1 are mem mapped to one contiguous block, while those of slave 2 and 3 are mapped to another contiguous block. However, on K2E and K2L, sgmii module registers of all slaves are mem mapped to one contiguous block. SGMII APIs expect slave 0 sgmii base when API is invoked for slave 0 and 1, and slave 2 sgmii base when invoked for other slaves. Before this patch, slave 0 sgmii base is always passed to sgmii API for K2E regardless which slave is the API invoked for. This patch fixes the problem. Signed-off-by: WingMan Kwok <w-kwok2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

netcp_core is the first driver that will get initialized and the modules (ethss, pa etc) will then get initialized. So the code at the end of netcp_probe() that iterate over the modules is a dead code as the module list will be always be empty. So remove this code. Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The netcp interface is not fully initialized before attach the module to the interface. For example, the tx pipe/rx pipe is initialized in ethss module as part of attach(). So until this is complete, the interface can't be registered. So move registration of interface to net device outside the current loop that attaches the modules to the interface. Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, if netcp_allocate_rx_buf() fails due no descriptors in the rx free descriptor queue, inside the netcp_rxpool_refill() function the iterative loop to fill buffers doesn't terminate right away. So modify the netcp_allocate_rx_buf() to return an error code and use it break the loop when there is error. Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently netcp_module_probe() doesn't check the return value of of_parse_phandle() that points to the interface data for the module and then pass the node ptr to the module which is incorrect. Check for return value and free the intf_modpriv if there is error. Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently netcp_rxpool_refill() that refill descriptors and attached buffers to fdq while interrupt is enabled as part of NAPI poll. Doing it while interrupt is disabled could be beneficial as hardware will not be starved when CPU is busy with processing interrupt. Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A deadlock trace is seen in netcp driver with lockup detector enabled. The trace log is provided below for reference. This patch fixes the bug by removing the usage of netcp_modules_lock within ndo_ops functions. ndo_{open/close/ioctl)() is already called with rtnl_lock held. So there is no need to hold another mutex for serialization across processes on multiple cores. So remove use of netcp_modules_lock mutex from these ndo ops functions. ndo_set_rx_mode() shouldn't be using a mutex as it is called from atomic context. In the case of ndo_set_rx_mode(), there can be call to this API without rtnl_lock held from an atomic context. As the underlying modules are expected to add address to a hardware table, it is to be protected across concurrent updates and hence a spin lock is used to synchronize the access. Same with ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid() & ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid(). Probably the netcp_modules_lock is used to protect the module not being removed as part of rmmod. Currently this is not fully implemented and assumes the interface is brought down before doing rmmod of modules. The support for rmmmod while interface is up is expected in a future patch set when additional modules such as pa, qos are added. For now all of the tests such as if up/down, reboot, iperf works fine with this patch applied. Deadlock trace seen with lockup detector enabled is shown below for reference. [ 16.863014] ====================================================== [ 16.869183] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 16.875441] 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 teobaluta#1 Tainted: G W [ 16.881176] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 16.887432] ifconfig/1662 is trying to acquire lock: [ 16.892386] (netcp_modules_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c03e8110>] netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518 [ 16.900321] [ 16.900321] but task is already holding lock: [ 16.906144] (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c053a418>] devinet_ioctl+0xf8/0x7e4 [ 16.913206] [ 16.913206] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 16.913206] [ 16.921372] [ 16.921372] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 16.928844] -> teobaluta#1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 16.932865] [<c06023f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8 [ 16.938521] [<c04c5758>] register_netdev+0xc/0x24 [ 16.943831] [<c03e65c0>] netcp_module_probe+0x214/0x2ec [ 16.949660] [<c03e8a54>] netcp_register_module+0xd4/0x140 [ 16.955663] [<c089654c>] keystone_gbe_init+0x10/0x28 [ 16.961233] [<c000977c>] do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x1f8 [ 16.966714] [<c0867e04>] kernel_init_freeable+0x148/0x1e8 [ 16.972720] [<c05f9994>] kernel_init+0xc/0xe8 [ 16.977682] [<c0010038>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c [ 16.982905] -> #0 (netcp_modules_lock){+.+.+.}: [ 16.987619] [<c006eab0>] lock_acquire+0x118/0x320 [ 16.992928] [<c06023f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8 [ 16.998582] [<c03e8110>] netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518 [ 17.004064] [<c04c48f0>] __dev_open+0xa8/0x10c [ 17.009112] [<c04c4b74>] __dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144 [ 17.014853] [<c04c4c3c>] dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48 [ 17.020334] [<c053a9fc>] devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4 [ 17.025729] [<c04a59ec>] sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8 [ 17.030865] [<c0142844>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688 [ 17.036173] [<c0142ae4>] SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c [ 17.041046] [<c000ff60>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 [ 17.046441] [ 17.046441] other info that might help us debug this: [ 17.046441] [ 17.054434] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 17.054434] [ 17.060343] CPU0 CPU1 [ 17.064862] ---- ---- [ 17.069381] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 17.072522] lock(netcp_modules_lock); [ 17.078875] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 17.084532] lock(netcp_modules_lock); [ 17.088366] [ 17.088366] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 17.088366] [ 17.094279] 1 lock held by ifconfig/1662: [ 17.098278] #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c053a418>] devinet_ioctl+0xf8/0x7e4 [ 17.105774] [ 17.105774] stack backtrace: [ 17.110124] CPU: 1 PID: 1662 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 teobaluta#1 [ 17.118637] Hardware name: Keystone [ 17.122123] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 17.129862] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 17.137079] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c0068e34>] (print_circular_bug+0x210/0x330) [ 17.145161] [<c0068e34>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c006ab7c>] (validate_chain.isra.35+0xf98/0x13ac) [ 17.154372] [<c006ab7c>] (validate_chain.isra.35) from [<c006da60>] (__lock_acquire+0x52c/0xcc0) [ 17.163149] [<c006da60>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c006eab0>] (lock_acquire+0x118/0x320) [ 17.171058] [<c006eab0>] (lock_acquire) from [<c06023f0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8) [ 17.179140] [<c06023f0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e8110>] (netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518) [ 17.187484] [<c03e8110>] (netcp_ndo_open) from [<c04c48f0>] (__dev_open+0xa8/0x10c) [ 17.195133] [<c04c48f0>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 17.203129] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 17.211560] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 17.219729] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 17.227378] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 17.234939] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 17.242242] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 17.258855] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off [ 17.271282] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 17.279712] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1662, name: ifconfig [ 17.286500] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 17.290413] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 17.295728] [ 17.297214] CPU: 1 PID: 1662 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 teobaluta#1 [ 17.305735] Hardware name: Keystone [ 17.309223] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 17.316970] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 17.324194] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 17.332112] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 17.340724] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x28) [ 17.348982] [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open+0xc4/0x10c) [ 17.356724] [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 17.364729] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 17.373166] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 17.381344] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 17.388994] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 17.396563] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 17.403873] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 17.413772] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): eth0: link is not ready udhcpc (v1.20.2) started Sending discover... [ 18.690666] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off Sending discover... [ 22.250972] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off [ 22.258721] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): eth0: link becomes ready [ 22.265458] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 22.273896] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 342, name: kworker/1:1 [ 22.280854] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 22.284767] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 22.290074] [ 22.291568] CPU: 1 PID: 342 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 teobaluta#1 [ 22.300255] Hardware name: Keystone [ 22.303750] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work [ 22.308895] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 22.316643] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 22.323867] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 22.331786] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 22.340394] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c9d18>] (__dev_mc_add+0x54/0x68) [ 22.348401] [<c04c9d18>] (__dev_mc_add) from [<c05ab358>] (igmp6_group_added+0x168/0x1b4) [ 22.356580] [<c05ab358>] (igmp6_group_added) from [<c05ad2cc>] (ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x4f0/0x5a8) [ 22.365019] [<c05ad2cc>] (ipv6_dev_mc_inc) from [<c058f0d0>] (addrconf_dad_work+0x21c/0x33c) [ 22.373460] [<c058f0d0>] (addrconf_dad_work) from [<c0042850>] (process_one_work+0x214/0x8d0) [ 22.381986] [<c0042850>] (process_one_work) from [<c0042f54>] (worker_thread+0x48/0x4bc) [ 22.390071] [<c0042f54>] (worker_thread) from [<c004868c>] (kthread+0xf0/0x108) [ 22.397381] [<c004868c>] (kthread) from [<c0010038>] Trace related to incorrect usage of mutex inside ndo_set_rx_mode [ 24.086066] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 24.094506] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1682, name: ifconfig [ 24.101291] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 24.105203] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 24.110511] [ 24.112005] CPU: 2 PID: 1682 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 teobaluta#1 [ 24.120518] Hardware name: Keystone [ 24.124018] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 24.131772] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 24.138989] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 24.146908] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 24.155523] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x28) [ 24.163787] [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open+0xc4/0x10c) [ 24.171531] [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 24.179528] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 24.187966] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 24.196145] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 24.203803] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 24.211373] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 24.218676] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 24.227156] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): eth1: link is not ready Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2@ti.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>