Return of ClayRat Expanded Features and Techniques #1637
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
This blog provides a detailed technical analysis of ClayRat Android spyware v3.0.8, focusing on how it achieves full device takeover by abusing Android’s Default SMS privileges and Accessibility Services, combined with a packed/encrypted dropper, screen recording, remote desktop, notification abuse, overlays, and a rich WebSocket-based C2 command set.
Distribution & Masquerading
ClayRat is distributed via:
🔧 Technical Details
Abusing Accessibility for Lock-Screen Credential Theft & Auto-Unlock
The main trick is to register a high-privilege Android Accessibility Service that listens to SystemUI/Keyguard events and reconstructs lock-screen secrets. For PINs, track the ordered sequence of digit button presses until entry completes. For passwords, monitor text-change events in the password field and concatenate the characters. For patterns, record the grid node indices or touch coordinates forming the pattern path. Store the captured secret in
SharedPreferencesunder a key likelock_password_storage(with type and timestamp). Later, when a C2 command such asauto_unlockarrives, replay the stored PIN/password/pattern via Accessibility gestures (taps/swipes) to automatically unlock the device, giving attackers physical-equivalent access without OS exploits.MediaProjection-Based Screen Streaming & Remote Desktop ...
🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
auto_unlock, notification phishing/harvesting, SMS/telephony control, and discovery/proxy commands plus available IoCs.Tests: Not run (not applicable).
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.